THE USAGE OF THE TERMS

ΠΑΡΟΚΕῖν, ΠΑΡΟΙΚΗΣΕΙ and ΠΑΡΟΙΚOS

IN PHILO

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January 1964

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The Usage of the Terms Παροικία, Παροικνήσις

and Παροικός in Philo

The terms Παροικία, Παροικνήσις and Παροικός appear in Philo in several places, but not as profusely as one might expect from the importance of the sojourning motif in his writings. The terms κατοικία and αὐτοπρώτωs are important as opposite expressions and ζητομενία and εἰκός as synonyms. The term Παροικία occurs only once (Conf. 80) and is equivalent to Παροικνήσις, the former being almost exclusively a Biblical (LXX) and Christian expression.

In our quest for the meaning of these terms in Philo we have found that they occur in contexts where he deals with the relationship between the soul and the body. Philo's basic concern is with the destiny of the soul in the human body. The latter is conceived as a temporary sojourning place for the soul, which is on its way to its home in heaven from whence it came. This motif of sojourning is present throughout Philo's writing. Yet he does not always describe the relationship between the soul and the body by using the terms under consideration but employs different images to convey the same meaning. Consequently, in our presentation we shall be using some passages in which these
terms do not occur but which reveal the same motif of sojourning. In the following treatment we do not pretend to be thorough, an impossible task for a paper of this kind, given the ubiquitousness and kaleidoscopic nature of the theme. Our purpose will be to consider the specific contexts in which these terms occur. To this end we shall quote several passages and endeavour to interpret them in the light of other Philonic passages and with the aid of the insight of others and our own.

God does not grant as a gift to the lover of virtue that he should dwell (κατοικία) in the body (ἐν σώματι) as homeland (ἐν οἰκίαν), but only permits him to sojourn (παραοικίαν) there as in a foreign country (ἐν ἄλλῃ ἐξωτικῇ ἐπιφύλαξι). For "knowing thou shall know," he says, that thy seed shall be sojourners in a land which is not their own" (Gen. 15:13). But every fool takes the body for the place of his nativity and studies to dwell there not to sojourn. (Her. 267)

This paragraph presents in a summary fashion the context in which Philo uses the term παραοικίαν and its opposite κατοικία. The lover of virtue—who is the same one as the lover of God, of philosophy or wisdom—receives from God the knowledge that his true self (the νοήμα) is only temporarily tied up with the body. The body is as a foreign country to the higher soul (νοήμα) as it sojourns to the invisible and conceptual world (the soul's homeland) whence it came. On the other hand, the fool has no such knowledge but considers the body to be his true home and studies to dwell therein. He has a basic misunderstanding about the nature of reality.

We see here a series of contrasting concepts that reveal Philo's way of thinking: the lover of virtue vs. the fool,
The Verb ΠΑΡΟΙΚΕΙΤΩ and the Adjective ΠΑΡΟΙΚΟΣ

The verb ΠΑΡΟΙΚΕΙΤΩ in the writers of the Greek classical period signified to dwell by, beside or near (cf. Thucydides I, 71; III, 93 and Isocrates IV, 162); the corresponding adjective ΠΑΡΟΙΚΟΣ meant dwelling beside or neighbouring (cf. Herodotus VII, 235; Thucydides III, 113). Besides the geographical meaning the Greek civil law attributed a special significance to the adjective ΠΑΡΟΙΚΟΣ. In the Greek cities in contradistinction to the passer-by (the ἄρτιον οὐ καίτοις or the ΠΑΡΟΙΚΟΙ οὐ καίτοις), there were foreigners who dwelt in the cities in a more or less permanent way. They had to pay a special tax and lived under certain restrictions in respect to the ownership of property and marriage with citizens. In principle they were supposed to have a patron (ΠΡΟΣΤΑΤΗΣ) as a legal intermediary between them and the state. They were called
by various appellations: ξωκος, ὥν, οἰκος, ἐτοικος, and finally Ποικος. The verb Ποικεῖν attained also a derived meaning in connection with the technical usage of Ποικος and came to mean to reside in a place as a Ποικος.

From this brief foray into the meaning of the verb Ποικεῖν and its adjective Ποικος, two connotations have emerged: the one general, the other technical, in the legal sense. Both meanings appear in very definite geographical and sociological contexts. These specific usages are absent from Philo. He uses the terms in the passage that we are considering in a wholly metaphorical sense, yet his usage reflects the technical meaning. This is especially true when Philo speaks of the fact that God is the owner of all things and that we only have the use of the created things and that these also may be taken away from us:

But this work which is His own He has bestowed freely, for He needs it not. Yet he who has the use does not thereby become possessor, because there is one lord and master of all, who will most rightly say: "All the land is mine"—which is the same as 'all creation is mine'—"but you are strangers and sojourners before me (Lev. 25:23 ὄνειρα ἐπὶ Ποικεῖν καὶ Ποικος ἐν καρπίαν ἑυδοκούσιν)." In relation to each other all created beings rank as men of longest descent and highest birth. All enjoy equal honour and equal rights, but before God they are aliens and sojourners. (Ποικος δὲ ἐπὶ Ποικος ἔπι Ποικος καὶ Ποικος ἐν καρπίαν). For each of us has come into this world as into a foreign city in which before his birth he had no part, and in this city he does but sojourn until he has exhausted his appointed space of life. ... God alone is in the true sense a citizen (Ποικεῖος) and all created beings is a sojourner and alien (Ποικος), and those whom we call citizens (Ποικος) are so called only by license.
of language. But to the wise it is sufficient bounty, if where ranged beside God, the only citizen, they are counted as aliens and sojourners, since the fool can in no wise hold such a rank in the city of God, but we see him an outcast (ποιημένον) and nothing more. (Cher. 119-121).

Philosophically, the created world here as a city and God as the sole possessor and rightful citizen, that is, the only one who has inalienable rights, so to speak. Men can never claim possession of created things but have only granted privileges and are accordingly characterized as aliens and sojourners. This metaphorical usage of the terms παρκος and επιφυτος reflects the technical usage of the term παρκος in Greek cities. The fact that Philo can use παρκος and επιφυτος together reveals that he is not interested in the precise meaning of these terms but rather uses them instrumentally to express his basic contention that man can have no permanent abiding place neither in the world nor in the body as part of it. The man who considers this world his fatherland is lost.

Here, as well as in other passages in Philo, there is a polemic against the Stoics who also considered the world in terms of a city and the wise man as the one who thought of himself as a citizen of the world, in the sense that he lived according to the immanent principle of nature, the ἀληθεία. Now Philo's point is that this approach to the universe is all wrong, even though he uses some of the terminology of his opponents. The wise man can never consider himself a citizen of the world but only a sojourner on the way to his true home which lies beyond
this world. We cannot press too far God’s relationship to the
word in this context. It has to be seen in terms of the ἀγάπη and
the doctrine of the powers. It is through the ἀγάπη and
the powers that Philo relates God to the world. God as He is
in himself is beyond the world. Since the νόμος of man be-
longs to the invisible and immaterial realm it can never con-
sider itself as a citizen of this world. Really Philo is
calling the Stoic a fool and outcast. The term fool he usually
applies to the one who gives in to the passions and desires of
the body, a charge that does not apply to the true Stoic. The
charge against the Stoic would then be that he has a false
philosophy in respect to the nature both of the universe and of
God. The two cannot be put in the same basket, argues Philo,
and man who is related to God cannot be treated in that way,
either.

In a passage like this Philo comes near to the theological
meaning of the word τυφλος and ἄριστος in the LXX and the
Hebrew Bible respectively. Both the LXX and the Hebrew text
use the terms τυφλος (τυφλος) and ἄριστος (ἄριστος) in the technical way already
mentioned when referring to the patriarchs, to the nation or to
the foreigners in Israel who had certain legal rights. However,
there is a theological significance to the term. Israel,
even after taking possession of the land, remains a sojourner be-
fore the Lord. Yahweh, as Lord and Creator, remains the sole
possessor of the land and Israel has only been entrusted with
it as an act of grace and therefore she has the status of a stranger or sojourner before Him with whom she is in covenant relationship (cf. Lev. 25:23; I Chr. 29:14-16). This theological usage of ἡμέρας has a definite reference to the land and the object of God's grace is definitely the people of Israel. All this specificity is lost in Philo. He speaks of all men: "In relation to each other all created beings rank as men of longest descent and highest birth. All enjoy equal honour and equal rights, but before God they are aliens and sojourners." Furthermore, he is not concerned with the fate of a nation but with the fate of the individual soul. Man does but sojourn in this world until he has exhausted his appointed span of life, then the separation of contestants, the ἐν μιᾷ vs. the ἐν δύο, takes place (Leg. All. I, 105-107). The latter disintegrates and the former returns back to the invisible and conceptual realm. Really Philo is speaking here about the wise man who is the only one that knows that he is a sojourner. This gives him rank as the knower of the mysteries of the Lord (Leg. All. III, 109). Philo has become completely general in his usage of ἡμέρας and at the same time utterly individualistic and spiritual.

Again both in the LXX and in the Hebrew Bible the word ἡμέρας (Study the exiles of Israel.) refers to the historical exiles of Israel. The exile (ἡμέρας) is conceived theologically in terms of judgment, but also eschatologically inasmuch as God will in the end bring his dispersed people back to Jerusalem. The eschatological note is completely lacking in Philo. His
παροικος does not refer to a specific people spread throughout the world for whom God has a future but to the soul that sojourns in the body.

The ἐννῆ —-- the Enemy of the Soul

That is an excellent saying of Heracleitus, who on this point followed Moses' teaching: "We live," he says, "their death, and are dead to their life." He means that now, when we are living, the soul is dead and has been entombed in the body as in a sepulchre (ἴνα ἐγκαταθῇ τῷ ἐγκαταθῇ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτα ἦν ἔργον); whereas, should we die, the soul lives forth with its own proper life, and is released from the body, the benefic corpse to which it was tied (Leg. All. I, 108; cf. Spec. Leg. Iv, 188).

This is a general statement and is not specific as to what makes the body a tomb or a corpse. But it affirms Phil's basic tenet that the body is the enemy of the soul. While in the body the soul, at least of the wise man, is dead to passions. Death, the natural occurrence, is liberation since by it the soul returns to the genuine sphere of existence, the invisible world of God and the ideas. This is borrowed language, as we shall see more in detail below, and of course, highly metaphorical. The figures of tomb and corpse are used to convey the essential incompatibility between the soul and the body. Any other figure would do just as well, e.g. prison-house.

The Body is Wicked and a Plotter against the Soul

The body ... is wicked and a plotter against the soul, and is even a corpse, a dead thing. For you must make up your mind that we are each of us nothing
but corpse-bearers, the soul rising up and carrying without till the body which of itself is a corpse. ... By nature ... it is wicked and a plotter against the soul, but it is not evident to all that it is so, but to God alone and to anyone who is dear to God: "Er was wicked in the sight of God" (Gen. 38:7). For when the mind soars aloft and is being initiated in the mysteries of the Lord, it judges the body to be wicked and hostile; but when it has abandoned the investigation of divine things, it deems it friendly to itself, its kinsman and brother (Leg. All. III, 109).

Again the body is conceived as corpse, a dead thing, and the soul as corpse-bearer. The former actively schemes against the latter. However, the true nature of the body is not self-evident. It is known to God and to those who have been initiated in the mysteries of God. The mysteries of God refer to the knowledge that is revealed to the wise man through the study of philosophy and wisdom. Basic in this study is the practice of contemplation. Through contemplation the lover of God learns about the nature of the created universe, the invisible realm of ideas and about the existence of the Creator, the One who Is, the Lord. Philo thought that these mysteries are available in the law of Moses and he obtained them by using the allegorical method of interpretation. When he speaks of being initiated into the mysteries of God he is using the language of the mystery cults. It is doubtful, however, whether it is through him that mystery religions reached the synagogue, as Goodenough maintains. But it is noteworthy that he is influenced by that language and presents the patriarchs in the style of the Hellenistic mysticism of the ascension of the soul toward God. However, Philo thought that
these symbols were contained in the Jewish tradition originally.

To Become Estranged from the Body and its Desires is the
Chief Business of the Wise Man

"For we may almost make it an axiom that the business of
wisdom is to become estranged (άλογος ζηλος) from the
body and its cravings" (Leg. All. I, 103-104).

Wisdom here refers to the understanding (ἐγνώμονας)
which alone is necessary for the acquisition and practice of virtue. The body fails to cooperate to this end and is actually a
hindrance. The verb άλογος ζηλος is very strong and means
to become estranged or be made an enemy. This estrangement be-
tween the body and the soul is not merely a neutral relationship
of negativity but rather an active enmity carried on on both
parts. For this reason Philo calls the struggle between these
two contestants the greatest of all wars: "The war that is waged
in time of peace, the war that has no break or pause, and is the
greatest of all wars" (Det. 174). It is the war between the pas-
sions and pleasures of the body and the υδατις in man. There
is present here a modified ethical and physical dualism. The
dualism is between the visible and material vs. the invisible and
immaterial. It is not ultimate, as God remains the creator.

When Philo speaks of the ψυχη as the ψυχη of the
soul, he is not using original terminology but rather is echoing
Plato and other Greek writers. In Cratylus (400 C) Plato, speaking through Socrates, makes references to the explanations given to the term ἔωμα :

I think, says Socrates, this admits of many explanations, if a little, even very little, change is made; for some say it is the tomb (σημα) of the soul, their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life; and again, because by its means the soul gives any sign (ἐνικεῖν) which it gives, it is for this reason also properly called "sign" (ἐνικεῖν). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think that it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe (ἐνυψάλα), like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe (ἔωμα) better, the prison for the soul, until the penalty is paid, so not even a letter needs to be changed.

Philo uses the term ἔωμα in the first and third senses. The body is both the σημα and the ἔωμα of the soul, that is, the tomb and the prison (Heres 85). But when he speaks of the body as a prison house for the soul he cannot conceive of the body as a keeping-place for the soul until the penalty is paid. The soul while dwelling in the body is in very serious danger and may in fact die. Plato's theory of the transmigration of the soul is totally absent from Philo. There is no other life after this to pay the penalty incurred by not living according to the commandments of God. This is the decisive life and the soul chooses either wisdom or death in this present existence. The soul that chooses the way of the body is dead while the body may yet be alive. The soul that chooses the way of wisdom will be transposed to its home in heaven when the body dies and dismi-
tegrates. Philo makes this clear when he speaks about the general and specific death when interpreting Gen. 2:17:

... death is of two kinds, one that of the man in general, the other that of the soul in particular. The death of the man is the separation of the soul from the body but the death of the soul is the decay of virtue and the bringing in of wickedness. It is for this reason that God says not only "die" but "die the death," indicating not the death common to us all, but that special death properly so called, which is that of the soul becoming entombed in passions and wickedness of all kinds. And this death is practically the antithesis of the death which awaits us all. The latter is the separation of combatants that had been pitted against one another, body and soul, to wit. The former, on the other hand, is a meeting of the two in conflict, and in this conflict the worse, the body, overcomes, and the better, the soul, is overcome. But observe that wherever Moses speaks of "dying the death," he means the penalty-death, not that which takes place in the course of nature. That one is in the course of nature in which the soul is parted from the body; but the penalty-death takes place when the soul dies to the life of virtue, and is alive only to that of wickedness (Leg. All. I, 105-107. Cf. Abr. 258-259; Heres 275-276).

It is in this context that Philo's concept of free will fits. The death-penalty incurred by the soul he puts squarely on the shoulders of the free choice of man. When speaking about what makes man superior to the animals he says:

We find that the special prerogative that he has received is mind. ... This branch of the soul was not formed of the same elements out of which the other branches were brought to completion, but it was allotted something better and purer, the substance in fact of which divine natures were wrought.... For it is mind alone which the Father who begot it judged worthy of freedom, and loosing the fatters of necessity suffered it to range as it listed, and of that free-will which is His most peculiar and most worthy of His majesty gave it such portion as it was capable of receiving. For the other living creatures in whose souls the mind, the element set apart for liberty,
has no place, have been committed under yoke and bridle to the service of men. ... But man, possessed of a spontaneous, self-determined will, whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate choice, is with reason blamed for what he does wrong with intent, praised when he acts rightly of his own will. ... The soul of man alone has received from God the faculty of voluntary movement, and in this way especially is made like him, and thus being liberated, as far as might be, from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its liberator. And therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen (Immut. 45-46; cf. Ibid. 49-50).

Knowledge of good and evil is given to the ῥύσα in man; and furthermore man is under duty to choose the good and reject the bad. Otherwise he incurs the penalty of death. The choice of virtue and wisdom is consequently a matter of life and death in this present existence. The death of the soul comes when it considers the body its home and is entombed in its passions and desires. Consequently the soul who really knows her destiny practices death to the body in order that it may partake of the life which is incorporeal and immortal. In this Philo is drawing from Plato (Phaedrus 64A, 67E) but puts this in the context of the Jewish God in whose presence the ambitions of the philosophic mystic are satisfied. Cf the souls incarnated in the bodies only a few follow this path. These know themselves as sojourners in the body and not as permanent dwellers. To reject the body as his home is therefore the most basic decision that man can make.

Moses, the wisest of men, knows where his true home is.

He weeps bitterly (Ex. 2:6) in the days when he was imprisoned in the ark of the body, bedaubed as with asphalt pitch (Ex. 2:3). ... He weeps for his captivity, pressed sore by his yearning for a nature
that knows no body. He weeps also for the mind of
the multitude, so erring, so vanity-ridden, so miserable--
the mind that clings to false opinion and thinks that
itself, or any created being at all, possesses aught
that is firm, fast-cemented and immutably established,
whereas all that is fixed and permanent in circum-
stances and condition is graven as on stone in the keep-
in of God alone. (Conf. 106 ff.)

Moses cries for a nature that knows no body simply because
the body is material, unstable, changing and mutable. Only God
alone is fixed, immutable and established. God belongs to the
realm of the invisible and immaterial, so to fly to God is the
business of the wise man. (Cf. Immut. 167-172) Nothing of mor-
tal matters has any real being or subsistence. (τίποσ ἀνθρώπου
ζηνέκει τά καί τά ζητάται Immut. 172).

Stages Through Which the Soul Passes While Sojourning
in the Body

The soul as it sojourns in the body passes through different
stages, ending up finally by choosing the path of wisdom or the
path of death.

1. The stage of Childhood

"For the first seven years of his life the infant possesses
the simplest elements of the soul. The soul exists in a fluid
state and has not yet received any impressions of good and evil"
(Heres 294). This is the first generation of the soul. In
another place Philo goes further: "In the first stages of our
coming into existence the soul is reared with none but the pas-
sions to be its comrades, griefs, pains, excitements, desires,
pleasures, all of which come through the senses, since reason is not yet able to see good and evil and to form accurate judgment between them, but is still slumbering, and its eyes closed as if in deep sleep" (Cong. 81).

At this stage of development the soul or reason cannot distinguish between good and evil. Reason is pictured as slumbering or in deep sleep, terminology that reminds one of later Gnosticism. While passing through this stage the soul inhabits in Egypt which symbolizes sense. This is only a temporary resting place.

2. The stage of Adolescence

This stage Philo describes in at least two passages: "The second [generation of the soul] is that which follows childhood and begins to associate with evils, both these engendered by the soul of its own motion and those which are willingly accepted at the hands of others. ... The curse is heaviest on this 'generation', to use the figurative term for the literal 'age', in which the body is in its bloom and the soul inflated, when the smouldering passions are being fanned into a flame, consuming ... whatever lies in their path" (Heres 295, 296). "But as time goes on, when we leave the stage of boyhood and are adolescent, there springs from the same root the twofold stalk, virtue and vice, and we form an apprehension of both, but necessarily choose one or the other, the better-natured choosing virtue, the opposite kind, vice" (Cong. 83).

It is at this stage that the knowledge of evil comes, both engendered by the soul and by the hand of others. Since this is
the time when the body is at its peak, the passions and vices are raging like a fire. Both the stage of childhood and adolescence are conceived by Philo on the analogy of the sojourn of the people of Israel from Egypt to Canaan. "We must know," he says, "that Egypt symbolizes sense, and the land of the Canaanites vice, and thus it is natural that when Moses brings the people out of Egypt he should lead them into the country of the Canaanites. The man, as I have said, at his first coming into being, receives for his habitation (ὁ ἡμέρας ἡμερών) Egyptian passion, and his roots are fixed in pleasures and pains, but after a while he emigrates to a new home (ἡ ἡμέρας ἡμερών ἀποτέλεσμα), vice.

The reason has advanced by this time to a higher degree of vision and while it apprehends both alternatives, good and evil, chooses the worst, because mortality is so large an ingredient in the reason, and evil is native to mortality as its opposite, good, is to the divine" (Cong. 85).

Significant here is the fact that reason has progressed to the extent that now it can apprehend good and evil, and yet it chooses evil. Philo frankly says that it is a necessary stage in the progress of the soul and cannot be avoided. Both the age of childhood and adolescence are according to nature. "Now according to nature these are the native-lands (τιμὸς τὸς ὑπάρχοντος) of the two ages: Egypt, that is, passion, of the age of childhood; Canaan, that is vice, of the age of adolescence" (Cong. 85). In another place he speaks more plainly. "It must needs be that mortal man shall be opposed to the nations of the passions and receive the calamities which are proper to created being" (Heres 272).
However, so long as man is under the rule of the passions and vices he is in slavery and under cruel masters (Ibid.). He is so to speak, trapped and needs salvation. It is at this point that Philo introduces the third stage.

3. The stage at which the healing influences of philosophy operate

This stricken generation or age must be tended on its sick-bed by a third, taking the form of philosophy with its healing art, and put under the spell of sound and salutary reasoning. Through this it will be able to void the vast overload of sins and to fill its void, its starvation, its fearful emptiness of right action (Heres 297; cf. Sac. 15 ff.).

The line of development up to this point has been passion, vice, and now philosophy. Really the first and second stages of this development of the soul are of minor importance in Philo. What he is really interested in are the following stages—namely, philosophy and wisdom, and within these two the knowledge of God through his works and through direct vision.

In the borderline between the stage of adolescence or vice and the stage of philosophy, Philo presents the encyclical studies as the entrance to the latter. "After its migration (αφανεία) to Canaan, the soul weds Hagar" (Cong. 86). Hagar in Philo refers to the encyclical studies which were prevalent in the Hellenistic world. He considers them necessary for any further progress in philosophy but only as a sojourning station. Since Hagar means sojourning in Hebrew, Philo does not get tired of saying that the encyclical studies cannot constitute an abiding place for the lover of wisdom, but only a sojourning station. It is in this
context that many of the specific references to appear in his writings. A few examples will bear this out.

For the wise Abraham complies with her when she recommends the course to follow. For at an earlier date when he had not yet become perfect but, before his name had been changed, was still only inquiring into supramundane things, being aware that he could not beget seed out of perfect virtue, she advises him to beget children out of the handmaiden, that is, school learning, even Hagar (Gen. 16:2 ff.). This name means "sojourning," for he that is studying to make his home in perfect virtue, before he is registered as a member of her city, sojourns with the subjects learned in the schools, that he may be led by these to apply unfettered powers to virtue" (Leg. All. III, 244).

The story of Sarah, Abraham and Hagar is completely allegorized in the usual Philonic fashion. Sarah becomes virtue, and in another context wisdom, as wisdom and virtue are used interchangeably. Abraham is the man who is in search of wisdom. Before entering that city called wisdom he has to pass through the gate of the encyclical studies. There cannot be any begetting from wisdom unless there is a prior mating with the learning of the schools. But the image of the gate and of sexual intercourse are used by Philo.

For we are not capable as yet of receiving the impregnation of virtue unless we have first mated with her handmaiden, and the handmaiden of wisdom is the culture gained by the primary learning of the school course. For just as in houses we have outer doors in front of chamber doors, and in cities suburbs through which we can pass to the inner part, so the school course precedes virtue" (Cong. 9-10: 71-78).

The reason why the learning of the schools, which included grammar, music, and rhetoric, among other things, can only be a sojourning station stems from the fact that "the votary of the
school studies ... must necessarily be associated with the earthly and Egyptian body; since he needs eyes to see and read, ears to listen and hear, and the other senses to unveil the several objects of sense..." (Cong. 20). Here we have an emphasis typically Philonic—the devaluation of the sensual and material. The body and whatever comes through it belongs to the realms of the unreal and seeming; the truly real is the invisible realm which can only be seen with the "eye of the soul" and not with the physical eyes. The wise man cannot abide in anything that is sensual.

Philo characterizes the studies themselves as sojourners:

The lower education is in a position of sojourner (παρεγκεια). For knowledge, wisdom and every virtue (ζευγια, γνωσις, ἀριθμος) are native-born, indigenous, citizens in the truest sense (μητρικη, γνωσις, αυτοθυβως, πολιτεια), and in this they are absolutely alone; but the other kinds of training... are on the borderline between foreigners and citizens. For they belong to neither kind in its pure form, and yet in virtue of a certain degree of partnership they touch both. The sojourner insofar as he is staying in the city is on a par with the citizens, insofar as it is not his home, on a par with foreigners" (Cong. 22-23).

In this passage Philo tries to elucidate the relationship of the encyclopaedia to wisdom, knowledge and virtue by using the language current at that time about the relationship of people to the city. As was pointed out before, there were citizens, who had full rights; sojourners, who had certain rights and were under the protection of the community; and the foreigners, who were just transients or passers-by. As before, Philo leaves behind the sociological and legal context of the terms and uses them completely in a metaphorical way. Now instead of speaking
of the relationship of the soul to the body he speaks of the relationship of the encyclopa to wisdom, which amounts to the same thing. His purpose is to point out that the studies have a certain legitimacy in the life of a wise man, but only as stepping-stones to the legitimate rulers of the soul, namely, virtue, wisdom and knowledge. When the soul pursues the latter, it is really in its proper atmosphere or home. They are citizens in the true sense for they have a legitimate right to claim the soul as their place of abode. For indeed the soul was made for them and vice-versa.

In giving this place to the encyclical studies Philo again is drawing from the general Hellenistic culture at his disposal. Plutarch in his Moralia (De Liberis Educandis 10) puts forth the idea that a free-born child be allowed to get a taste of the general education but to honour philosophy above all. He also presents the same Sarah-Hagar allegory in terms of Penelope and her handmaids:

It was a clever saying of Bion, the Philosopher, that just as the suitors, not being able to approach Penelope, consorted with her maid servants, so also do those who are not able to attain philosophy wear themselves to a shadow over the other kinds of education which have no value. Wherefore it is necessary to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education.12.

The secular studies are only a sweet fragrance but not the real food for the soul.

For he who contents himself with secular learning only does but sojourn and is not domiciled with wisdom (ποιεῖται ψωμίνα ζητεῖν, οὕτως ἐκ τῆς σοφίας). He sheds indeed over the soul, as it were, a sweet fragrance from the exquisite niceties of his studies, but yet
it is food not fragrance that he needs for his health" (Sac. 43- 44).

The studies again are conceived as necessary trimmings but nothing more. The true food for the soul is wisdom. At this point we are already at the final stage of the soul's sojourning while in the body.

4. The stage when the soul definitely turns away from sin into wisdom.

So after this healing treatment (of philosophy) there grows in the fourth generation within the soul power and vigour, because it has fully apprehended good sense, and is immovably established in all virtues ... For under the fourth member ... the soul turns back from sinning and is declared heir of wisdom ... (In this stage) we make good our claim to complete health and strength, when we feel that we are turning back from wickedness and laying our hands to the good" (Heres 298-299).

The wise man of Philo is the one who attains the goal of life—namely, to fly away from the body and all externality and to dwell in wisdom. By allegorizing the Old Testament patriarchs he presents them as wise men who considered themselves sojourners in the body on the way to their homeland, that is, heaven. While in the body their only abiding-place is virtue and wisdom, through which the return back home is guaranteed. The basic insight of this wisdom is the fact that the wise man does not belong to the sphere of the transient and sensual but to the realm of the invisible and immaterial. Therefore he only sojourns while in the body.

It is Moses who presents all wise men as sojourners (παραεινήσεις);

"Their souls are never colonists leaving home for a
new home. Their way is to visit earthy nature as men who travel abroad and learn. So when they have stayed awhile in their bodies, and beheld through them all that sense and mortality has to show, they make their way back to the place from which they set out at first. To them the heavenly region, where their citizenship lies, is their native land; the earthy region in which they become sojourners is a foreign country (Πατριῶν τό οίκον, τῶν οὐρανῶν ἄρμου τοὺς ἐκ τῶν περιπλάνων ἐν τῷ πάθει τού σαμαριτίου ὡς εἰσήκουσαν τούς οὐρανούς (Conf. 77-78).

Philo again shows that he knows the legal and sociological contexts in which the terms ἦτοροκτίνος, εἴσηται ἀπότικος, and ἀνεξάρτητος are used but applies them metaphorically.

The city of the world cannot be a permanent abiding-place to one who belongs to another fatherland, namely heaven. In the paragraphs preceding the above quotation Philo has a long discussion about the fools who choose to make the body their permanent abode.

Their lives are a veritable chaos without any resting place and without any semblance of good. All who have wandered away from virtue and accepted the starting points of folly, find and dwell in a most suitable place, a place which in Hebrew is called Shinar (a reference to Genesis 11), and in our own "shaking out." For all the life of the fools is torn and hustled and shaken, ever in chaos and disturbance, keeping no trace of genuine good... (Conf. 68-69).

Again it is in contrast to the fool that the wise man sees himself as a sojourner in the body.

The way to attain virtue is presented by Philo in Aristotelian fashion. In one passage (Ethics Nic. I, 9, 1099b, lines 9-10) Aristotle mentions three ways of attaining virtue and happiness: by learning, ὁμοθετοί, by habit, ἑτερομομολυβδον, or ἀνεξάρτητος, or by some divine dispensation ἐοίροι προσαρθεῖται. In another passage (Ibid., X, 9, 117ab, lines 20-23) the possibilities are
by teaching, ἀπαγωγή, by habit, ἀθανάτιος, or by nature, φυσικός. 14 Philo offers this same schematization and discusses the same possibilities in various places (Ab. 5; Som. I, 167-170; Cong. 36; Mut. 12). It is not necessary to assume that Philo got his scheme from Aristotle. It may have been the common property of the various philosophical schools. Furthermore, when Philo speaks of virtue he does not get tired of saying that virtue is the activity of God in the soul. It is no longer the self-activity of the autonomous soul in the usual Greek fashion but rather the impregnation of God through his ζυζίζων. 15

According to Philo, the historical patriarchs possess all these qualities but through allegorization he sees each of the patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, Jacob—as types of the soul, τὸ πνεῦμα χυτός, all of them, of course, men of worth, ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. Abraham pursues the good through teaching, Isaac is good by nature, and Jacob attains it through practice. Each one of these patriarchs is a sage. As such they sojourn in the body and pursue wisdom.

Abraham -- a Figure of Knowledge Gained by Learning

Abraham moved from nature study to the study of ethical philosophy. This is how Philo presents him:

Literally his name was changed, actually he changed over from nature-study to ethical philosophy and abandoned the study of the world to find a new home in the knowledge of its Maker, and from this he gained piety, the most splendid of possessions (Mut. 76).

The change from Abram to Abraham is a moral change: from the study
of God's work to the study of God himself, from astrology to piety. The study of God is the real dwelling-place for the wise man; in it he finds his home. As can be seen, Philo does not identify the world with God. The former is always seen as created by God. In this sense Philo remains a Jew. Abraham was born in the Chaldean materialistic Pantheism. The Chaldeans were especially active in astrology and attributed everything to the movement of the stars. Hence they glorified the visible and gave no attention to the invisible and intelligible, and concluded that the world was God, thereby profaning the creator. But Abraham did not remain in Pantheism but opened his soul,

as though after a profound sleep and beginning to see the pure beam instead of deep darkness, he followed the ray and discerned what he had not beheld before, a charioteer and presiding over the world... (Abr. 68-70).

Obvious here again is Philo's polemic against the Stoics. For the latter theology was identical with physics. Not so for Philo. For him God (the Is) is beyond the world and is only related to it through his powers. The One is and exists can only be perceived through the eye of the soul in his existence but not in his essence.

Isaac -- a Figure of Knowledge Gained by Nature

"Isaac is a figure of knowledge gained by nature, knowledge which listens to and learns from no other teacher but itself... Isaac is a dweller in his native land" (Som. I, 160). Isaac was good by nature. He needed only kindness and goodness to lead him,

having obtained by nature goodness and beauty of
character, he was not one who had been improved by the adornments of a governor, but as a result of the gifts showered upon him from above, he shewed himself good and perfect from the start (Som. I, 162).

Isaac does not have to migrate to a new home, so to speak. Since he is good and perfect from the beginning, he already dwells in the native soil of the soul. It should be noted that Isaac does not need of the governing or ruling power of God but only of the kindness. As said before, it is through the powers, at the head of which is the $\theta\xi\mu\iota$, that God deals with the world. By the use of the $\theta\xi\iota\rho\iota\varsigma$ and the powers Philo has God in control of the world but God as He is himself is beyond the world. He contains the universe but He is not contained by it. The Philonic God cannot be gotten hold of through the study of nature, yet through his powers He rules the universe.

**Jacob — a Figure of Knowledge Gained by Practice**

Jacob after much struggle attains the land of virtue wherein he is asleep to the life of sense, but awake to that of the soul, and therefore at rest in God. God approves the rest which Jacob won, not without war and war's hardships, a war in which he had no arms and destroyed no men (away with that thought!) but overthrew the troops of passion and vices that oppose virtue (Som. I, 174).

This passage shows how Philo uses different terminology to express the same basic idea. He can speak of being asleep to the passions and awake to virtue, of being at war with the passions or being at peace in the land of virtue, of sojourning in the body or dwelling in wisdom. All these terms he uses metaphorically to express what he considers the proper relationship between
the soul and the body. Behind this language is the basic concept
that the invisible part of man, his \( \nu \sigma \varepsilon \varsigma \), is his true self,
and that his visible part, the body, has no abiding reality and
that while in the body, the \( \nu \sigma \varepsilon \varsigma \) is really in danger of being
swallowed up by the body, except it cultivate virtue and mystical
experiences in order that it may return to the invisible and in-
telligible world at the time of death. The mystical visions of
the wise man in his present existence are sort of anticipat
experiences of his final resting place, the heavenly realm.

Speaking of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who all had the goal
to be well-pleasing to the Maker and Father of all, Philo says:

This kind is few in number but in power so mani-
fold and mighty that it cannot be contained by the
whole compass of the earth but reaches to heaven, pos-
sessed of an intense longing to contemplate and for
ever be in the company of things divine. After an
investigation of the whole realm of the invisible to
its very end, it straightforward proceeds to the im-
material and conceptual, not availing itself of any of
the senses but casting aside all the irrational part of
the soul and emphasizing that part which is called
mind and reasoning (\( \nu \sigma \varepsilon \varsigma \), \( \gamma \varepsilon \delta \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \delta \)) (Praem. 26).

Several phrases in this statement require consideration.

"This kind is few in number" is a phrase not uncommon in Philo.
The company of the wise is never large. Only the suppliant
souls and those gifted by God can enter the road of wisdom. The
majority of men live in subjection to the passions and the sens-
able things.

"Possessed of an intense longing to contemplate" the attain-
ment of the knowledge of God is Philo's basic concern. One way
to attain it is by a direct vision of God. This is actually
The highest possible knowledge of God given to the soul and is available to men of the Israel type—"the one who sees God."

This knowledge of God is not mediated through creation but is attained in the mystical flight of the soul to the invisible and immaterial realm. There the soul sees God and is seen by God and becomes ἑαρύ, like God Himself (Post. 28; Som. II, 226).

In other places Philo seems to contradict himself by speaking about the invisibility and unknowability of God. Accordingly, the wise man cannot know God as he is in Himself, but only the fact of his existence. This knowledge is mediated and is predicated on the basis of the Greek concept of the ᾿ΑΛΑ, which presupposes a distinction between existence and essence.

At work here is Philo's Jewish background, which also postulates the impossibility of seeing God face to face. This indirect knowledge of God is available through his works and the φύς and powers play an important role in its mediation. Yet in spite of the impossibility and hopelessness of attaining direct knowledge of God, Philo is constantly emphasizing that the longing to have a direct vision of God is the noblest longing of man. Thus Philo seems to be moving within two world views—the Greek and Jewish view for which a direct knowledge of God is not a possibility, and the Gnostic view in which it is. However, whether through direct vision or by mediation, γνῶσις is the goal of the wise man, that is, γνωστικ of who he is and where he is going. There he abides until the ὑστερός is translated to the invisible and immaterial realm at the time of death.
Abbreviations

Ab.  -  De Abrahamo
Cher. - De Cherubim
Cong. - De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia
Conf. - De Confusione Linguarum
Det. - Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat
Heres - Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres
Immut. - Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis
Leg. All. I, II, III - Legum Allegoria I, II, III
Mut.  - De Mutstione Nominum
Post. - De Posteritate Caini
Praem. - De Praemis et Poenis
Sac.  - De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini
Som.I,II - De Somnis I, II
Notes

1. See the list of abbreviations on page 28.

2. We are following the English translation of F. H. Colson or G. H. Whitaker in the Loeb Classical Series.

3. He distinguishes between the rational and irrational soul. Only the former belongs to the invisible and immaterial realm and therefore can return to it.


5. ΠΡΟΦΗΤΑΣ is the LXX translation in this place for the Hebrew אֵל. The translation as such carries theological overtones but that makes no difference for Philo. Further down he can speak of אֵל אֹהֶל and כֹּל אֹהֶל rather than προφήτας and παροικος.


7. In the LXX ΛΙΑΣΤΟΡΔ is the more common translation for אֵל אֹהֶל; cf. Schmidt, "Λιαστορδ," T W N T, vol. II, 99. In Praem.115 Philo uses Λιαστορδ in a completely allegorical sense when he speaks of the dispersion which vice has wrought as a Λιαστορδ וְיִרְשָׁא. The wise man endeavours to be restored to the land of wisdom and virtue from the dispersion of vice. Obviously this does not refer to any historical dispersion of the Jewish people or any people nor to any eschatological ingathering.


10. Cf. Phaedo 64 c.


12. Wolfson (Philo, I, 145-146) gives more examples of the same attitude towards the encyclopa the month the Stoics.

13. We have not gone into the distinction that Philo makes between philosophy and wisdom, for that would have taken us too far afield. Sometimes he seems to identify them, yet in other places he appears as putting philosophy at the service of wisdom, conceiving the latter as the revelation given in the Scriptures and interpreted allegorically. Cf. Wolfson, op. cit. 87-163.
14. Wolfson (Philo, II, 197) points out that Aristotle accepted only the first two as possibilities and rejected the third. This is not true of Philo, who takes all three into consideration.


16. We are dependent for this analysis on Hans Jonas, Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist, II, 70-74.
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